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CASE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and many similar
state rules, require certain specified people to submit to independent
medical examinations (IMEs). 1 Those rules are without a doubt "pow*Copyright © 1992 by Peter H. Berge.
**Visiting Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. I am
very grateful to Robin West, Vicki Jackson, and Michael Gottesman for organizing the presentation of this article; to the Georgetown University Law Center faculty; to William Eskridge
and Susan Hankin Denise of Georgetown University; to Laura Underkuffler of Duke University
for her encouragement and helpful comments; and to Brenda Mezick, Georgetown University
Law Center, class of 1993, for her assistance in proofreading and cite checking.
1. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 35; 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2231, at 665 (1970).
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erful instrument[s] for ascertaining the truth. '2 However, the naked
search for facts has always been balanced against countervailing concerns such as personal dignity and public health.3 Thus, Rule 35 has
4
always had closely guarded bounds.
Those bounds have recently been tested in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 5 The court was asked
to order the plaintiff in a products liability case to undergo an HIV
antibody test.6 Whether and under what circumstances an HIV test
can be ordered in discovery is not clearly answered in Rule 35.7 As
most state's- IME statutes are closely modeled after Rule 35, they
also fail, save for one," to take voluntary HIV testing into account. 9
Rule 35 and the state IME statutes simply do not give specific guidance
regarding how HIV testing should be handled. 10 To answer whether
and when HIV testing can be mandated under IME statutes, the
balancing mechanism of the rule must be understood within the context
of the realities of HIV testing.1
At stake is more than just balancing an individual's privacy against
a party's right to challenge claims of physical illness. Keeping HIV
testing voluntary is a matter of grave concern to public health 12 and,
in most jurisdictions, the law.'8 By ordering the plaintiff to submit to
the HIV test, the court haunts us with the specter of parties, at least
those in high risk groups, routinely being required to submit to HIV
tests. 4 Rule 35 and state IME statutes would then be working against

2. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2231, at 665-66.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 53-82.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 53-82.
5. Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Pettyjohn 3), No. 91-CV-2681, 1992 WL
105162, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1992).
6. Id. The test is a two-part blood test. Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1988). It tests not for the presence of HIV itself, but for antibodies produced by the body
when it comes into contact with HIV. Id. at 721 & n.1. The first test is the Enzyme-Linked
Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA). Id. at 721. It is quite sensitive to HIV antibodies and prone
to giving false positive results. Id. at 721 & n. 1. Thus, if the ELISA is positive, a second more
involved but more accurate test is given, called the Western Blot Test. Id. at 721. For convenience sake I shall refer to HIV antibody testing process as "HIV testing" throughout this article.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 38-50.
8. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 38-50.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 38-50.
11. See infra notes 51-82 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 86-136 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 140-99 and accompanying text.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 211-20.
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privacy and public health policy. To avoid this, involuntary HIV testing
must be limited under Rule 85 to only those situations where HIV
status is put directly at issue as a matter of liability. 15
II.

THE MECHANIC'S CASE

In June of 1989, a mechanic was working on a multi-piece truck
tire rim. 16 While he was trying to mount the rim on a tractor-trailer,
the rim exploded. 17 The right side of the mechanic's face was ripped
open, he lost his right eye, and most of the cartilage, bone, and teeth
from the right side of his face.'8 The injuries required extensive reconstructive surgery. 19
The mechanic sued the manufacturer of the rim, Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company, along with several other defendants. ° As is
normal in such a case, the mechanic claimed he would suffer future
damages. 2' He claimed future wage loss, loss of earning capacity,
22
future medical expenses, and future disability.
During the course of discovery, the defendants subpoenaed the
mechanic's medical records.2 When the records from the Hospital at
the University of Pennsylvania (HUP) arrived, they were incomplete.? 4
They did not include any information concerning chemical abuse or
AIDS/HIV testing.25 The hospital refused to release those records
without special authorization.2 The defendants obtained a court order
requiring the mechanic to authorize release of the records. 27

15. See infra notes 211-30 and accompanying text.
16. Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Pettyjohn 5), No. 91-2681, 1992 WL 203390,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1992).
17. Id.
18. Motion of Plaintiff James A. Pettyjohn for Protective Order Denying Additional HIV
Testing, at 2, Pettyjohn 3 (No. 91-CV-2681) [hereinafter Motion for Protective Order].
19. Id.
20. Memorandum of Plaintiff James A. Pettyjohn in Opposition to the Motion of Defendants
Goodyear and Motor Wheel Corporation to Compel Plaintiff's Redeposition and for the Release
of Plaintiffs Confidential Health Information, at 1, Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
(Pettyjohn 2), No. 91-2681, 1992 WL 94895 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1992).
21. See Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Pettyjohn 4), No. 91-2681, 1992 WL
176494, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1992).
22. Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Authorization for Release of Confidential Medical Records,
at 1, Pettyjohn 2 (No. 91-2681) [hereinafter Motion to Compel].
23. Id. at 1-2.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Pettyjohn 1), No. 91-CV-2681 (E.D. Pa.
filed Mar. 18, 1992).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

The confidential records showed that the mechanic had a history
of IV-drug use?8 and that in June 1989 the mechanic had taken an
AIDS/HIV antibody test. 29 The test was negative?' That would seem
to end the matter except that a half year after the negative test
results, the mechanic was again seen at HUP's emergency room. 31 A
scribbled note by an emergency room attendant indicated that the
mechanic had said that he was HIV positive.? In a sworn affidavit,
the mechanic stated that he had only tested the one time, that he had
told the emergency room attendant he had tested negative, and that
the note, therefore, must have been a mistake.?
Goodyear returned to court for an unprecedented order: an order
requiring the mechanic to submit to another HIV test.3 The attorneys
for Goodyear argued that the notation in the hospital record indicated
that between June and December of 1989 the mechanic had taken
another test in which he tested positive.3 The mechanic's lawyers
opposed Goodyear's motion and requested a protective order to prevent the testing.3 6 The Federal District Court in Pennsylvania sided
with Goodyear. The court ordered: "That the record thus far demonstrates a genuine controversy as to plaintiffs HIV status and defendants have shown good cause for the testing. Defendant's Motion for
a testing is GRANTED, and plaintiffs Motion for a Protective Order
is DENIED."- The order raises grave concerns about the balance
between privacy, public health, and factfinding in litigation under Rule
35.
III.

INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS: RULE 35 AND ITS
STATE COUNTERPARTS

The task faced by the Pennsylvania court was not one clearly
answered on the face of the rule. Rule 35 does not make any explicit
reference to HIV testing; it provides:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood
group) of a party . . . is in controversy, the court in which
the action is pending may order the party to submit to a

28.
29.

Motion to Compel, supra note 22, at 2.
Motion for Protective Order, supra note 18, at 2.

30.

Id.

31.

See id. at 3.

32.

Id.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See id. at 3-4.
See Pettyjohn 3, 1992 WL 105162, at *1.
Motion for Protective Order, supra note 18, at 3.
See Pettyjohn 3, 1992 WL 105162, at *1.
Id.
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physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or
The order may be made only on
certified examiner ....
motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person
to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time,
place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and
the person or persons by whom it is to be made.s
Although the statute does refer to blood typing examinations, its failure to mention HIV testing is not surprising. Those who drafted and
amended Rule 35 simply never contemplated HIV testing. The original
drafters of Rule 35, in 1938, certainly never envisioned the AIDS
crisis. Even those who amended the rule to add blood tests to the
language were not doing so with AIDS in mind. That amendment was
in 1970, 39 nearly a decade before AIDS was even identified. 40 None of
the amendments since 1970 have dealt with the AIDS epidemic or
HIV testing.41 Since the rule itself does not indicate how to deal with
HIV testing, we must appeal to the history and policies that inform
the IME rule.
Requiring medical examinations has always been a touchy matter
for American courts. 2 The first reported examination order did not
occur until 1868;43 still, for a long time after, many states forbade
compulsory examinations entirely."' Traditionally, the federal courts
had no power to compel an examination unless state law permitted
examinations. 5 The courts were reluctant to compel examinations be-

38. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
39. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 35 advisory committee's note, 1970 amend.
40. See Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Pneumocystis Pneumonia - Los Angeles, 30
MORBrDITY & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. 250, 251 (1981) (identifying for the first time what
would later be called AIDS).
41. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7047(b), 102 Stat. 4401 (amending
Rule 35 to allow examinations by psychologists); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at 311
nn.1 & 2-5 (stating that the 1987 amendment removed gender specific language, and the 1991
.amendment allowed examinations to be made by a suitably licensed or certified examiner).
42. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 239-42
(3d ed. 1985).
43. Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 334, 344 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1868).
44. See, e.g., Yazoo v. Robinson, 65 So. 241 (Miss. 1914); Stack v. New York N.H. & H.R.,
58 N.E. 686 (Mass. 1900); Note, Power of Court to OrderPhysical Examinations in Personal
Injury Cases, 25 VA. L. REV. 73 (1938) (stating that nine states share the minority view that
courts do not have the inherent power to order physical examinations).
45. Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172, 177 (1900) (permitting a federal
court to order a physical examination because such an order was allowable under the laws of
the state in which the action was brought).
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cause they were concerned that such a requirement would violate the
"sanctity of the person," or as we might call it today, privacy. 46
An absolute prohibition, however, created a grave problem of basic
justice: the malingering wolf could claim injury with impunity cloaked
in the sheep's clothing of privacy. 47 Thus, over the years most states
eventually allowed their courts to order examinations in limited circumstances. 48 The federal courts followed suit in 1938 by adopting
Rule 35.49 Because most states' rules are now very similar to Rule
35, many federal courts find state court rulings instructive for inter5
preting Rule 35. 0
The rules allowing compulsory examinations did not constitute
abandonment of the earlier concerns about involuntary examinations. 51
Rather, they resulted from a balancing of those concerns against the

46.

Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891).
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference ...
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping
and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay
bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority,
is an indignity, an assault and a trespass....

Id.
47. Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 280
(1939) ("This provision (also adopted over vigorous protests) should prove an effective barrier
to much malingering and fraudulent testimony (heretofore so difficult to rebut) as to the real
physical or mental condition of parties to civil actions.").
48. See Cecil M. Draper, Medical Examinations of Adversary Parties,25 RocKY MTN. L.
REV. 163, 163-64 (1953). By the adoption of Rule 35 in 1938, 30 states allowed court-ordered
physical examinations. Id. Eight states passed statutes giving the courts such power. Id. at
163. In another 22 states, the authority to do so was based on the inherent power of the courts.
Id. at 164.
49. Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387, 388 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (stating that Rule 35 was
adopted to conform to federal practice regarding court-ordered examinations to state practice).
50. Id. (explaining that because many states have provisions substantially similar to Rule
35, state as well as federal decisions can be helpful in applying the federal rule); see Richard
J. Barnet, Compulsory Medical Examinations Under the Federal Rules, 41 VA. L. REV. 1059,
1064 n.25 (1955) (stating that Delaware, Arizona, and New Jersey have statutes which adopt
the language of Rule 35 verbatim). Compare MINN. R. Civ. P. 35 and N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. &
R. § 3121 (McKinney 1991) and PA. R. Civ. P. 4010 (stating in an explanatory note: "Prior
Rule 4010 has been substantially revised to conform closely to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35.") with FED.
R. Civ. P. 35.
51. See Barnet, supra note 50, at 1064 & n.25 (stating that state courts usually only ordered
physical examinations in personal injury cases, and some states specifically limited the use of
compulsory medical exams by statute).
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needs of justice. 2 This is seen in the narrowness of the rules. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a good example. In contrast to
the wide-open scope of general discovery under Rule 26,5 the scope
of medical testing under Rule 35 is quite limited. Under Rule 35,
medical examinations and testing can be ordered4 only when "in controversy ' rather than for "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant" as in general discovery. In addition, under Rule 35 "good
cause" 57 for the examination must be shown rather than a mere reasonable calculation that the request would "lead to the discovery of...
admissible evidence,"5 as in the general provisions governing discovery.
In deciding whether to order a physical examination, the court
must balance whatever interests compete with the litigants' need to
discover information. Generally those interests are thought to be the
'"personal dignity" or privacy issues that so troubled earlier courts.5 9
Nothing in the rule, however, limits consideration to personal dignity

issues,60 as the privacy of medical matters has traditionally been
founded upon both personal dignity and public health concerns. 61
52. See id. at 1061 (stating that many courts attempted to justify a litigant's duty to submit
to an examination on a theory that the litigant had implicitly agreed to make any disclosure
necessary to ensure justice).
53. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1). In general, discovery may be had of "any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... ." Id. It is not even
an objection, generally, that the information sought is inadmissible at trial as long as the request
is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. Monetary sanctions
for failure to produce are presumed unless the court affirmatively finds that the refusal was
"substantially justified." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Rule 26 generally assumes the production of
relevant information. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Because a medical condition is classically privileged,
it is excluded by the very language of the rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
54. The strict letter of the rule requires an actual order from the court and requires good
cause before the order is issued. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a). As a practical matter, however, plaintiffs
in personal injury actions usually submit to examinations without a court order. This practice
is not necessarily a dilution of the good cause requirement. It is simply a recognition by all
concerned that there is good cause for an examination when the plaintiff voluntarily puts her
health at issue. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 35 advisory committee's note, 1970 amend.; Paula
M. Becker, Note, Court-Ordered Mental and Physical Examinations: A Survey of Federal
Rule 35 and Illinois Rule 215, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 725, 725 & n.3 (1980).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
56. Id. 26(b)(1).
57. Id. 35(a).
58. Id. 26(b)(1).
59. Becker, supra note 54, at 731-33.
60. FED. R. CIv. P. 35(a). The rule gives no specific guidelines for a court on when to
refuse to order a party to submit to a physical examination. See id. The rule merely states that
a court "may" order an examination. Id.
61. CLINTON DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 25, 28-29 (1958).
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The most familiar example of medical privacy is the doctor-patient
privilege. It represents the victory of public health concerns over the
common law tradition of compelling physicians to testify.6 Physicians
need the unvarnished truth to properly diagnose and treat their patients and therefore protect public health.- To obtain such candor,
patients must feel free to tell all to their doctor without the fear that
their conversations will later be revealed. 6 Thus, public health policy
was the driving force behind the creation of the privlege. The public
health policy of the doctor-patient privilege already limits discovery.6
It is the reason a party often must obtain authorizations to discover
past medical records.67
Special proscriptions beyond the doctor-patient privilege have been
extended to areas such as psychiatric and chemical dependency treatment. 68 Here again, public health concerns are central. Without specific
and serious privacy guarantees, people will hesitate to bare their souls
to psychotherapists or admit their dependency and seek treatment.
To obtain such information in civil discovery a litigant must meet the
standards of the privacy statutes. Those specific guarantees of privacy
take precedence over the general allowance of discovery found in the
Rules of Civil Procedure.6 9 Were this not the case, the public health

62. See id. at 9-10. The common law did not recognize a privilege for physicians. Id. at 11.
In setting that precedent, Lord Mansfield wrote:
If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be guilty
of a breach of honour, and of great indiscretion; but, to give that information in
a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be
imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever.
Trial of the Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Trials 355, 573 (1776). Circular the argument
may be, but numerous American jurisdictions have echoed Lord Mansfield's judgment. See, e.g.,
People v. Lane, 36 P. 16 (Cal. 1894); Estate of Koenig v. Barrett, 78 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1956);
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 178 A.2d 20 (Pa. 1935). New York bucked the common-law idea
and led the way for other states with its privilege statute in 1828. DEW17r, supra note 61, at
15 & n.3.
Interestingly, in the civil law of continental Europe, doctor-patient communications were "at
all times considered confidential and sacred." Id. at 9 n.1.
63. DEWITT, supra note 61, at 27.
64. Id.; see also Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876).
65. DEWITT, supra note 61, at 28.
66. Id. at 277-78.
67. See id. at 278.
68. See, e.g., Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 91 , U 801-817 (1989); Alcoholism & Other Drug Dependency Act, id. ch. 111 ,
6351-1 to 6351-8.
69. Roberts v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 593 N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Becker, supra
note 54, at 743-46.
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concerns about the release of psychiatric and chemical dependency
treatment would be mere shams. Thus, public health concerns similar
to those underlying the prohibition of involuntary HIV testing are
already a factor in the discovery of medical information in civil litigation.
The specific mechanism of balancing is contained in the rule itself:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood
group) of a party... is in controversy, the court in which
the action is pending may order the party to submit to a
physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or
certified examiner . . . . The order may be made only on
motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person
to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time,
place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and
the person or persons by whom it is to be made.70
Before ordering an examination the court must be satisfied that the
physical condition is 'incontroversy" and that "good cause" has been
shown for the examination.Y
When deciding if a physical or mental condition is sufficiently "in
controversy," the judge must decide "whether the issue to which the
physical condition pertains is of sufficient importance to require a
party to undergo the annoyance or discomfort of an examination."
One could just as well substitute the concomitant concerns of privacy
and public health for "annoyance or discomfort" since they have even
greater ramifications than mere annoyance or discomfort. As issues
get farther from that core of the lawsuit, they are less and less likely
to be sufficiently important to warrant an examination. As the annoyance, discomfort or impositions on privacy and public health increase, the closer the condition to be tested for must be to the center
of the controversy.

70. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a); see Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117 (1964); Guilford
Nat'l Bank v. Southern R.R., 297 F.2d 921, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1962).
71. FED. R. Crv. P. 35(a).
72. Id.; see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Beach v. Beach,
114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Stuart v. Burford, 42 F.R.D. 591 (N.D. Okla. 1967); Raymond
v. Raymond, 252 A.2d 345, 348-49 (R.I. 1969).
73. Barnet, supra note 50, at 1065. The first case to test the meaning of the "in controversy"
requirement interpreted it to mean "immediately and directly" in controversy. Wadlow v. Humberd, 27 F. Supp. 210, 212 (W.D. Mo. 1939). Only on questions of ultimate liability for the
plaintiffs claims could independent medical examinations be ordered. See id. That rule was
quickly denounced as too narrow. See Beach, 114 F.2d at 479; 4a JAMES MOORE & Jo D.
LucAs, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 35-03 (2d ed. 1992); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 1, § 2231.
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The most important question in any lawsuit is liability. As one of
the partners in my former law firm used to say, "You need three
things for a good personal injury case: liability, liability, and liability." 4
Other issues, such as procedure, damages, or credibility of witnesses
revolve around the liability issue. Thus, it would be improper to perform a psychological examination on a witness, even a party, merely
for an opinion about that person's propensity to tell the truth. Even
though liability may hinge on. credibility issues, it is still too far from
the central core of the liability to warrant the inconvenience, let alone
the stigmatization. The issue of damages is certainly very important
to the pocketbooks involved in the litigation, but it is quite distinct
from liability. No amount of damages makes or minimizes liability.
Though IMEs are often granted for issues pertaining to damages,75 it
should only be for conditions actually claimed as damages.
Under most IME statutes an equally important requirement must
also be met: the petitioner must have "good cause" to request the
examination.6 The good cause requirement is to be taken very seriously. It is the chief protector of privacy. Good cause is not "a mere
formality," but an express limitation of the rule.Y It means more than
mere relevance to the case. 78 To meet the burden requires "an affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to which the examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that good
cause exists for ordering each particular examination. '79 The motion
should be denied if information is available from other sources. 0
Good cause is, like the "in controversy" requirement, a flexible
balancing standard; good cause is generally balanced against privacy.
Because of this balancing requirement, if a court finds there is good
cause for one examination, the court will not necessarily find that
there is good cause for two examinations. Since a second examination
is a greater imposition on an individual's privacy, the petitioning party

74.
Minn.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
2d 473,

Conversation with David J. Moskal of Schwebel, Goetz, Sieben, & Moskal in Minneapolis,
See Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 117-19; Wadlow, 27 F. Supp. at 212.
FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a); Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 117-19.
Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 117-18.
See id.
Id. at 118-19.
See Marroni v. Motey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.
475 (Fla. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959 (1958).
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must show even greater cause for a second examination." Likewise,
the more intrusive the examination, the greater the imposition upon
privacy. Thus, as the intrusiveness of the requested examination increases, so does the requirement for a showing that the test is a
necessity.s
The problem is that the HIV test is no ordinary medical test.
Though its procedure is that of a simple blood test, its ramifications,
for both society and the individual, are cataclysmic. 3 AIDS is a devas-

tating, deadly disease that spawns irrational fears and blatant prejudice.

To combat the spread of AIDS, states across the country

have joined with public health officials to require that HIV testing be
voluntary. The policy of voluntary testing is directly at odds with
forcing someone to test under the IME statutes. Both privacy and
public health concerns of the AIDS crisis must be balanced against

the search for truth in litigation. Only then can it be determined how
to interpret the "in controversy" and "good cause" requirements of

the IME statutes.

81. Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118. Since the examinations are an invasion of privacy, the
number of examinations should be kept to a minimum. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d
43, 50 (7th Cir. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). Thus, many courts have
refused to grant more than one examination under Rule 35. Rutherford v. Alben, 1 F.R.D.
277, 278 (S.D. W. Va. 1940); see Enyart v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 241 S.W.2d 268, 269-70
(Mo. 1951) (interpreting a rule similar to Rule 35); Gardner V. Reynolds, 775 S.W.2d 173, 178-79
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Murdaugh v. Queens-Nassau Transit Lines, 113 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div.
1952). When multiple examinations have been granted, it has been for substantial reasons such
as claimed further deterioration in the party's condition, Roskovics v. Ashtabula Water Works,
174 N.E.2d 295 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1961), complaint of additional injury, City of Valparaiso v.
Kinney, 131 N.E. 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1921), or the initial report not covering all of the party's
injuries. Mayer v. Illinois N. Ry., 324 F.2d 154, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1963). Even in cases where
multiple examinations have been allowed, the courts have been cautious to note that multiple
examinations are extraordinary. See Roskovics, 174 N.E.2d at 297 (stating that multiple examinations should not be allowed for a defendant to obtain cumulative evidence, but rather, they
should be allowed for the defendant to ascertain the permanence of injuries). Thus before more
than one examination is ordered, there must be a showing of good cause that is stronger than
the level of good cause needed for an initial examination. Vopelak, 42 F.R.D. at 389.
82. Riss & Co. v. Galloway, 114 P.2d 550, 551 (Colo. 1941) (spinal tap denied because of
invasiveness); Bartolotta v. Delco Appliance Corp., 4 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1938) (barium
meal examination denied as too invasive); Roskovics, 174 N.E.2d at 298 (spinal tap denied
because of invasiveness).
83. See infra notes 86-113 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
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MANDATORY HIV TESTING ADVERSELY AFFECTS BOTH
PERSONAL PRIVACY AND PUBLIC HEALTH

Epidemics, though perhaps new in biological history,6 are nothing
new to the human age. The Black Plague, measles, and smallpox have
all swept the globe. They devastated all in their path. The human
cost was severe, but civilization may have taken an even heavier toll.87
During the outbreak of the Black Plague in Europe entire communities
died out and among those who survived ordinary routines and customary restraints broke down.M Bands of Flagellants, disdaining all authority, roamed the countryside beating themselves in bloody processions of passion to appease a wrathful God and attacking Jews,
"witches," or any others they thought were spreading the plague. 9
Lepers, who often looked grotesque but were not suffering from a
very contagious disease, were ostracized and unjustly imprisoned in
leper colonies. ° Thus, our responses to these epidemics have been
less than charitable and humane. Fear has motivated us more than
compassion.
We think ourselves beyond such responses. The past hysteria we
may attribute to an age of ignorance. We live, after all, in a new age:
an age of science and medicine. We now know, and can even look in
on, the micro-cosmos of the pathogenic bacteria and viruses. With
that knowledge we have created vaccines to control, if not eradicate,
small pox, polio, dyptheria, measles, and influenza; we now have antibiotics which have all but eradicated the Black Plague, and we have
public health measures to control cholera. 91 Into our self-congratulatory, secure, scientific world, a new plague has burst upon us: AIDS.
It threatens to strip away our thin veneer of enlightened scientism.
AIDS is a viral disease that breaks down the body's immune system
allowing opportunistic diseases to invade.- The breakdown of the

86. See WILLIAM McNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 40-41 (1976) (explaining that human
beings were ineffective in dealing with micro-organisms before the modem scientific age and
the advent of devices such as the microscope).
87. See generally id. (reviewing many epidemics throughout human history).
88.

GEOFFREY MARKS & WILLIAM

K. BEAT=Y, EPIDEMICS 86-91 (1976).

89. Id. For a chilling cinematic view of how the Plague affected people (as well as a parable
for our own times) one should see Ingmar Bergman's THE SEVENTH SEAL (Embassy Home
Entertainment 1987).
90. McNEILL, supra note 86, at 46, 145.
91. See generally MARKS & BEATTY, supra note 88 (explaining various procedures used
to treat and prevent various diseases).

92. See Abe M. Macher, The Medical Background, in AIDS

AND THE LAW

§§ 1.1, .14

(William H.L. Dornette ed., 1987) [hereinafter AIDS LAw]. It is caused by a retrovirus known
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body's immune system is incurable; 93 the "constellation of opportunistic
infections" almost inevitably moves in for the ldll.9 The picture of the
AIDS victim is a shell of a man wasted by the opportunistic infections,
his deeply recessed eyes staring out from a death's head skull in
hopeless, disoriented pain, reminiscent of the visions of Heronious
Boch. This disease causes its victims to experience a hell on earth;
people are terrified out of their rational minds.
The emotional shock to a person who discovers she is seropositive
is devastating.9 5 It is, in an all too real sense, a death sentence. The
despair leads a greater portion of the HIV positive to commit suicide
than the average population.9 Given the potential for profound
psychological trauma, great caution should be exercised before mandating testing.
As if the physical and emotional effects of the disease were not
enough of a shock, the method of transmission and the lifestyles of
the majority of the victims have sent middle-America into paroxysms.
The HIV virus that appears to cause AIDS is generally transmitted

as the human T-lymphotropic virus type III/lymphadenopathy-associated virus (HTLV-III/LAV).
Anthony S. Fauc et al., NIH Conference - The Acquired Immunodefiwiency Syndrome: An
Update, 102 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 800, 800 (1985). The virus infects white blood cells
called T-lymphocytes. Id. at 806. It destroys the T-helper/inducer cells which enable parts of
the immune system to function together. Id. at 809. The immune system as a whole is suppressed
and the body is thus vuhierable to the opportunistic infections. Id. Many now consider the
disease to progress through three stages: the seropositive stage, the AIDS-related complex
stage (ARC), and finally full blown AIDS. Richard Green, The Transmissionof AIDS, in AIDS
AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIc 28, 29 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter
AIDS GUmE]. The seropositive person simply tests positive of the presence of HIV antibodies
without exhibiting any depression of immuno response. Id. at 29-30. That person carries the
disease, and the damage to the immune system may cause the development of ARC or AIDS.
Id. at 30. "ARC causes moderate damage to the immune system and is characterized by
nonspecific symptoms of illness, such as" fever, lymphadenopahty, fatigue, and night sweats.
Id. AIDS is a major collapse of the immune system allowing the opportunistic infections to
invade and destroy the body. Id.
93. See Fauci et al., supra note 92, at 802.
94. Macher, supra note 92, § 1.16. There are any number of infections which can take
advantage of the AIDS victim's suppressed immune system. Id. Some of the more common
include the following:. Pneumocystis cariniipneumonia, disseminated cytomegalovirus, disseminated mycobacterium avium-intracellulare,Candida esophagitis (oral thrush), Mucocutaneous
herpes simplex, Cryptococcus neoformans meningitis, cerebral Toxoplasma gondii, and enteric
cryptosporidiosis. Id.
95. Richard M. Glass, AIDS and Suicide, 259 JAMA 1369, 1369-70 (1988).
96. Id.; Peter M. Marzuk et al., IncreasedRisk of Suicide in Personwith AIDS, 259 JAMA
1333, 1333 (1988).
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to adults and adolescents through sex or IV-drug use.9 Although the
virus has affected all sectors of society, its initial victims were generally homosexuals and drug addicts, with a rapidly increasing number
of poor, inner-city Blacks and Hispanics affected.98 Somehow, the white
picket fences, manicured lawns, and blue skies of the American dream
seemed threatened. To get it, to be suspected of having it, or even
to be tested for it, would effect the middle-American whispers of
immoral sex and association with "undesirables."
The reaction of others to an HIV-infected person is severe and
isolating.- It is a reaction that has characterized every plague over
the years: pure and abject fear. Examples abound: a news crew once
walked off a production set rather than tape and interview two people
with AIDS. o Another crew taped the show, but only on the condition
that the microphones be thrown away afterwards.101 Hospitals and
health care professionals have refused to treat and have neglected
AIDS patients.10 2 Children with AIDS have been denied access to
school.,- Many employers, upon discovering that employees are in-

97. See Macher, supra note 92, § 1.12, fig. 1-1. This is not to diminish the fact that the
HIV is transmitted in other ways such as blood transfusions, contaminated blood products for
hemophiliacs, and unhygenic handling of infected body fluids. Id. Those methods of transmission
simply are a very small percentage of the total cases. See id. Of the 33,245 cases of AIDS in
adults and adolescents in the United States reported to the CDC as of April 6, 1987, 66% of
those infected were homosexual or bisexual males, 17% were IV drug users, 8% were homosexuals who used IV drugs, and 4% were infected through heterosexual intercourse. Id. Only 2%
of the victims were infected by blood transfusions, and 1% were hemophiliacs. Id. Since blood
screening is much more accurate now, the number of those infected through transfusions or
hemophilia treatments should be expected to decrease. See Green, supra note 92, at 33.
98. See CDC, AIDS and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United
States: 1988 Update, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. S-4, at 1, 11 (Supp. 1989);
Huntly Collins, Confronting AIDS' Next Wave, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 28, 1992, at Al; Susan
Okie, AIDS Shifts to Drug-PlaguedInner Cities, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1989, at A3.
99. See Hospital Ousted Patient Over Fears About AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1984, at
A8; Frank Prial, TV Crew Leaves Set of AIDS Victims' Interview, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1985,
at B6.
100. Prial, supra note 99, at B6.
101. Id.
102. Cheryl Frank, AIDS Victims Are Wary of Discrimination,A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at
19, 19 (stating that paramedics refused to give aid to a heart attack victim when they thought,
wrongly, he had AIDS); Hospital Ousted PatientOver FearsAbout Aids, supra note 99, at As
(reporting that a man was ordered to leave a Boston hospital because he had AIDS); Municipal
Hospitalin Bronx Fined on Care of AIDs Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1986, at B10 (reporting
that a hospital was fined for refusing to give adequate care to a man with AIDS).
103. Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); White v. Western Sch. Corp.,
No. IP-85-1192-C (S.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. File); Board of

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/2

14

Berge: Settling Limits on Involuntary HIV Antibody Testing Under Rule 35
INVOLUNTARY HIV ANTIBODY TESTING

fected with HIV, attempt to fire them. 1' Those who test positive are
often shunned, ostracized, 10 5 and sometimes even assaulted. 1' There
have even been cafls to quarantine.i-

Educ. v. Cooperman, 507 A.2d 253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); District 27 Community
Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986). See generally Frederic C. Kass,
Schoolchildren with AIDS, in AIDS GUIDE, supra note 92, at 29-31; Faye A. Silas, Is School
for All, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at 18.
104. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (allowing a nurse
to be discharged for not disclosing HIV test results); Doe v. Rice, 769 F. Supp. 440 (D.P.R.
1991) (allowing a member of the National Guard to be discharged after testing positive for HIV);
Perez v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 637 (D.P.R. 1991) (allowing a VA hospital employee to
be discharged after testing positive for HIV); Aviles v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 217 (E.D.
La. 1988) (compelling a member of the Coast Guard to retire because of a positive HIV test
result); Doe v. Ball, 725 F. Supp. 1210 (M.D. Fla. 1988), afftd sub nom., Doe v. Garrett, 903
F.2d 1455 (1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1102 (1991) (allowing a member of the Naval Reserve
to be released because of a positive HIV test); Plowman v. United States Dep't of Army, 698
F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988) (allowing a civilian musician employed by the Army to be dismissed
after testing positive for HIV); C.J. v. Vuinovich, 599 A.2d 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (allowing a member of the National Guard to be discharged after testing positive for HIV);
Griffin v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 831 P.2d 42 (Ct. App. 1992), review allowed,
847 P.2d 409 (Or. 1993); Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va.
1990) (allowing termination after the employer discovered that the employee was HIV positive);
Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS GUIDE, supra note 92, at 109-25; Frank,
supra note 102, at 19 (stating that a gay store manager had been fired after he took the day
off to see a doctor because his employer thought he had AIDS).
A personal experience exemplifies how many employers feel about AIDS: I was once approached by an employer who wanted to know if he could legally fire someone because the
person had tested HIV positive. My shock was not so much that I was approached with the
question, but rather, who was approaching me. This employer had an extensive background in
biomedical engineering. He knew that all the evidence points to the conclusion that it is perfectly
safe to work with someone who is HIV positive because casual contact cannot spread the virus.
When I asked him about this, his response was uncharacteristically unscientific: 'They don't
know the exact mechanism of transfer; they haven't actually proven you can't get it from casual
contact." From this encounter I concluded that if someone with that employer's intelligence and
medical training is terrified by AIDS, people without his training must be even more terrified.
Given the hysteria, we have all the more reason to be exceedingly careful about disclosure of
HIV testing information.
105. See Citizens for Uniform Laws v. County of Contra Costa, 285 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Ct.
App. 1991) (detailing citizens' fight against an ordinance which prohibits housing discrimination
against the HIV positive).
106. See Florestine Purnell, FirmAction Quashes Harassmentof Gays, USA TODAY, Dec.
4, 1990, at A6; Curtis L. Taylor & Peg Tyre, Activists Hail Decision, NEwSDAY, Nov. 21,
1991, at 5.
107. Ronald Bayer & David L. Kirp, The United States: At the Center of the Storm, in
AIDS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMoCRACIEs 7, 30-33 (David L. Kirp & Ronald Bayer eds.,
1992).
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Discrimination against those who might be HIV positive is not
limited to the private sector. HIV-positive status can sway the judgment of courts.108 Moreover, institutionalized discrimination has even
been proposed. For example, although the Centers for Disease Control
has found there is almost no risk of a health care worker transmitting
the HIV virus to patients in treatment, 1°9 overly inclusive restrictions
on health care workers have been proposed- ° and, in some cases,
enacted."' From time to time, detention-camp-type quarantines have
been seriously proposed. 112 The fear of discrimination rising to the
level of governmental institutionalization is a valid fear.
As a Florida court has noted, "AIDS is the modern day equivalent
of leprosy. AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can lead to discrimination
in employment, education, housing and even medical treatment." 3
For some, the fear of testing is not just an ethereal notion of privacy,
it is not just denial; it is a well founded fear for one's dignity, livelihood,
and even one's very life.
V.
A.

HIV TESTING POLICY
Public Health Policy

The fear of disclosure creates a grave public health problem. The
ultimate goal of public health policy is to find a cure for or a vaccine
against the disease. Neither currently seems viable. There is little or

108. See R.E.G. v. L.M.G., 571 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the trial
court abused its discretion by awarding a wife 60% of the marital estate because her husband's
homosexuality may have exposed her to HIV).
109. CDC, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40
MOR3IDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Supp. RR-8, at 5, 1991). There is "no [statistical]
basis for recommendations to restrict the practice of [health care workers] infected with HIV
...who perform invasive procedures not identified as exposure-prone, provided the infected
[health care workers] practice recommended surgical or dental technique and comply with universal precautions and current recommendations for sterilization/disinfection." Id. Historical
experience with Hepatitis B indicates there is little risk of transmission even in many invasive
procedures, further supporting the belief that the risk is almost nonexistent. Id. at 4.
110. 137 CONG. REC. E2376-78 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer)
(speaking in favor of the Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Care Provider Protection Act
of 1991 which Congress failed to pass, but if it had passed, it would have mandated testing of
health care workers).
111. See Sean C. Doyle, Note, HIV-Positive, Equal ProtectionNegative, 81 GEo. L.J. 375,
388-93 (1992).
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (3d DCA 1985),
decision approved, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
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no possibility of a cure for AIDS, and serious obstacles hinder the
creation of a vaccine to prevent HIV infection. As June E. Osborn,
the Dean of the School of Public Health at the University of Michigan,
has written:

As to a cure, the limited state of our basic knowledge of
retroviruses makes quick success unlikely. As the first step
in their reproductive strategy, retroviruses copy their RNA
into DNA, which is then inserted among normal cell chromosomes. While molecular genetics is advancing rapidly, it is
not yet near the stage where specific genes can be found in
living cells and excised individually - which is what would
be required to undo the outcome of initial infection. Thus,
a person with antibodies to HIV can be assumed to be a
carrier, if not of the virus itself, then of the genetic informa4
tion to produce the virus in the future.1

As for a vaccine, though advances have been made, many obstacles
remain. 1r, At the very least, the fact that the HIV virus seems capable
of mutating quickly makes the task of creating a vaccine a desperate
and perhaps unwinable game of catch-up. 16 Even worse is the possibility, as proposed by several prominent AIDS researchers, that HIV

114. June E. Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, in AIDS LAW,
supra note 92, at 17, 25.
115. See PETER S. ARNO & KARYN L. FEIDEN, AGAINST THE ODDS: THE STORY OF
AIDS DRUG DEVELOPMENT, POLITICS AND PROFITS 17-21 (1992); Aids Vaccine Test, THE

(LONDON), May 19, 1992, at 9 (reporting that French researchers began testing an HIV
vaccine on 50 volunteers); Biotech Plunge Sparked Market Drop, REUTER Bus. REP., Nov.
15, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSRPT File (reporting that an announcement
that an expected HIV vaccine would have to undergo further tests had sent the stock market
into a plunge).
116. Osborn, supra note 114, at 25-26. As Dr. Osborn writes:
Among the scientific barriers that stand in the way of an HIV vaccine, the most
ominous appears to be the fact that the virus can evade the immune response by
antigenic variation. This capacity for antigenic change is well recognized in some
other retroviruses, and recent studies showing differences among various isolates
of HIV suggest that it too may have this property.
TIMES
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is not the sole cause of AIDS. 117 If so, the billions of dollars spent on
finding an HIV vaccine may be a wild goose chase. 118 With treatment
limited to prolonging life, cure doubtful, and hope for a vaccination
perhaps little more than a cruel mirage, education and changing lifestyles may well be the last hope to stem the spread of AIDS.
To stop the spread of AIDS, people who are at risk must get
testing, counseling, and treatment. The HIV positive should get medical treatment immediately because there is evidence that early treatment can prolong the life of the individual.11 9 Although it is important
for all people to practice safe lifestyles, it is imperative to discover
who is infected with HIV and to educate those people about safe
lifestyles. The challenge is to get those people tested while preserving
the greatest possibility to secure their cooperation in changing their
lifestyles.
Mandatory testing might seem a logical step, ° but it has been
rejected by the vast majority of public health officials.121 Though con-

117. DiscovererReworking View of AIDS, UPI, Apr. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File. Professor Luc Montagnier, who discovered the HIV virus, now believes
HIV might not be involved in all cases of AIDS. Id. Though he believes that HIV has something
to do with AIDS, he does not see it as the only triggering mechanism because some people
with HIV may never contract AIDS. Id. The search for an HIV vaccine may, therefore, be in
vain. Id. Others, such as Professor Peter Duesberg of the University of California at Berkeley,
take an even more dissident view. Neville Hodgkinson, AIDS: Can We Be Positive?, SUNDAY
TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 26, 1992, at 12 [hereinafter Hodgkinson, AIDS]; Neville Hodgkinson,
Experts Mount Startling Challenge to AIDS Orthodoxy, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 26,
1992, at 1 [hereinafter Hodgkinson, Experts]. He argues that HIV is neither new nor infectious.
Hodgkinson, Experts, supra, at 1.
118. Discoverer Reworking View of AIDS, UPI, Apr. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (reporting that Professor Luc Montagnier, discover of the HIV virus, expressed the opinion that an HIV vaccine may not be effective); see William Leith, New Theories,
Old Prejudices, THE INDEPENDENT, May 10, 1992, at 22 ("If HIV is not a necessary or a
sufficient cause of AIDS, then the multi-million pound HIV vaccine industry is a waste of
money.").
119. Ann C. Collier et al., A PilotStudy of Low-Dose Zidovudine in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1015 (1990); Neil M.H. Graham et al., 326 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1037, 1039 (1992) (stating that early treatment with AZT prolonged the life of
the recipients); Hiroaki Mitsuya et al., Molecular Targets for AIDS Therapy, 249 SCIENCE
1533 (1990).
120. See Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Is ConsideringMuch Wider Tests for AIDS Infection,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1987, at Al (reporting that federal health officials may recommend testing
for all marriage licenses, for all people hospitalized, treated for pregnancy, or treated for sexually
transmitted diseases). Mandatory testing has been proposed. Bayer & Kirp, supra note 107, at
26 (stating that over 600,000 names were on a petition which placed measures such as mass
testing on the California ballot).
121. See, e.g., Bayer & Kirp, supra note 107, at 26; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS 120 (1986) (rejecting mandatory testing as
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fidentiality is advocated as part of any mandatory testing program,
there is justified fear that through negligence or mismanagement,2
even well meaning, though misguided, official action will lead to public
disclosure of test results.m The actual benefits of such universal testing
may not be as good as they seem. A negative test result does not
necessarily give someone a clean bill of health. Since it can take up
to six months for the HIV antibodies to develop,'2 those recently

infected would not necessarily have a positive test result. Testing
would have to be done again in six months, and then again, and again.

Likewise, a positive result alone does not necessarily mean that a
person will develop AIDS.m Moreover, even if the funds were made
available to do massive and repeated testing, the test results themselves do not instruct people how to modify their behavior. Therefore,
counseling must be a part of the AIDS testing procedure.n2 However,

counseling further multiplies the already massive costs of nationwide,
repeated testing.m Even if confidentiality were insured, even if this

country had the money for repeated massive testing, and even if
counseling were provided for everyone, the coercive nature of massive
involuntary testing is incompatible with the trust and cooperation
needed to convince people to change their behavior.M Involuntary
testing chills the cooperation with public health officials needed to
combat HIV infection.m In the final analysis, mandatory testing is no
panacea. It is inefficient at best and, more likely, counterproductive.13o
Because of involuntary testing's abundant deficits, public health
officials are nearly unanimous in calling for voluntary testing. Thus,

incompatible with a free society); U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH

& HUM.

SERVICES, SURGEON

33 (1986) (rejecting
mandatory testing); Lawrence K. Altman, Mandatory Tests for AIDS Opposed at Health Parley,
N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 25, 1987, at Al, A18.
122. See Wayne King & Irvin Molotsky, Washington Talk: Briefing; Leak of Public Health
Records, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1986, § 1, at 6.
123. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 341 (Sup. Ct.
1986). Such a misguided official leak led to a child being prohibited from attending school. Id.
124. Lawrence L Altman, Citing AIDS, Officials Propose Tracking Transplants, N.Y.
GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME

TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, § 1, at 38.

125. Mark A. Rothstein, Screening Workers for AIDS, in AIDS GUIDE, supra note 92, at
126, 130.
126. See Larry Gostin, TraditionalPublic Health Strategies, in AIDS GUIDE, supra note
92, at 47, 54-55.
127. See id. at 56.
128. Id.; see Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 724 n.9 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
129. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project, 263 JAMA 1961, 1962 (1990).
130. See Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HAIv. L. REV. 1274,
1287-89 (1986).
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the Centers for Disease Control, 131 the National Academy of Sciences, 13 2 the American Medical Association,'3 the Surgeon General of
the United States, the United States Public Health Service, and most
state and local public health services have all strongly and publicly
opposed mandatory testing.'3 It is not surprising, then, that when
the Centers for Disease Control sponsored a major forum to discuss
mandatory testing, "not . . . a single public health official at the
conference advocate[d] mandatory testing" even for limited groups
such as hospital patients or applicants for marriage licenses.,, The
clear consensus among public health professionals is that HIV testing
must be voluntary as well as confidential. 3 6 It is the only practical
means of getting those at risk to test and still securing the greatest
possibility of their cooperation afterwards. One can be at least fairly
certain that those concerned enough to voluntarily test are also going
to be concerned enough to listen, learn, and modify their behavior, if
they have not already.
B.

Legal Policy

Legal policymakers have paid close attention to the consensus
among public health officials. There has, it seems, been little agitation
for mandatory testing. Even conservative scholars, like Richard
Posner, have agreed that the best way to fight AIDS is by education
and tolerance and thus, mandatory AIDS testing is a bad idea.' 37 Thus,
the vast majority of American jurisdictions have made voluntary testing the center pieces of their AIDS prevention laws. 13 In nearly all
jurisdictions now only voluntary HIV tests can be given except in
39
very limited circumstances.1

131.

See CDC, Public Health Service Guidelinesfor Counseling and Antibody Testing to
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 509, 511 (1987);
CDC, Update: Serologic Testingfor HIV-1 Antibody - United States, 1988 and 1989, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 380 (1990).
132. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS
14-15 (1986).
133. Board of Trustees, AMA, Prevention and Control of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, 258 JAMA 2097, 2100 (1987).
134. New York State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 609 (N.Y. 1991)
(approving of a state public health administrators argument that mandatory testing and contact
tracing inhibit people from cooperating with public health officials); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d
718, 721 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
135. Altman, supra note 121, at A18.
136. E.g., id.
137. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 163-65, 209 (1992).
138. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 142-85 and accompanying text.

Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36
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1.

Legislative Prohibition of Involuntary Testing

Policymakers across the United States have been listening closely
to public health experts. Nearly every state in the Union has now
directly attacked the AIDS crisis with comprehensive legislative
acts. 4 0 Many of the legislatures have specifically recorded their legislative intent. As the Kentucky Legislature wrote:
The General Assembly finds that the use of tests designed
to reveal a condition indicative of human inunuodeficiency
virus (HIV) infection can be a valuable tool in protecting
the public health. The General Assembly finds that despite
current scientific knowledge that zidovudine (AZT) prolongs
the lives of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome victims,
and may also be effective when introduced in the early stages
of human immunodeficiency virus infection, many members
of the public are deterred from seeking testing because they
misunderstand the nature of the test or fear that test results
will be disclosed without their consent. The General Assembly finds that the public health will be served by facilitating
informed, voluntary, and confidential use of tests designed
to detect human immunodeficiency virus infection.'1'
In like fashion, the Pennsylvania Legislature found:
The incidence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) is increasing in this Commonwealth at a significant
rate. Controlling the incidence of this disease is aided by
providing testing and counseling activities for those persons
who are at risk of exposure to or who are carrying the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which is the causative agent
of AIDS. Testing and counseling are promoted by establishing confidentiality requirements which protect individuals
from inappropriate disclosure and subsequent misuse of confidential HIV-related information. The General Assembly
also finds that, since certain specific behaviors place a person
at risk of contracting the virus, testing and counseling of
persons who are at risk of exposure to the virus makes an
efficient use of available funding.

It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote
confidential testing on an informed and voluntary basis in

140. See, e.g., 20A A.R. CODE ANN. §§ 20-15-901 to -906 (Michie 1991); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 7602-7612 (1993).
141. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.181 (Baldwin 1991).
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order to encourage those most in need to obtain testing and
appropriate counseling.142
The intent of the AIDS prevention acts, of which the Kentucky and
Pennsylvania acts are typical, is to follow the recommendations of
public health officials - that HIV testing should be voluntary and
the results confidential.'4
Central to AIDS prevention statutes that have recently been passed are provisions forbidding involuntary HIV testing and guaranteeing the confidentiality of test results.144 Indeed, prohibiting involuntary
HIV testing has been something of a cottage industry for legislatures
in the early 1990s. Twenty states adopted such provisions between
1987 and 1991.145 Almost every jurisdiction in the country now has a
statute requiring consent before an HIV test can be given or a statute
implying that the test must be voluntary. 146 Likewise, Congress has

142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7602(a), (c) (1993).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
144. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-11A-51, -54 (Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1202-1203
(Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-40, 31-17-2 (Michie Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
141.22-.23 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.181(5)(a), (c) (Baldwin 1992);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-143, -148(h) (1992); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3701.242, .243 (Anderson
1992 & Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.2 (West Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 7607 (1993).
145. They are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 22-11A-51 (Supp.
1992); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(A) (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(b), (c)
(Michie 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1401 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-582 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17A-2 to -3 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 325-16 (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.5-2.5 (Burns Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 214.181(5)(a), .625(5)(a) (Baldwin 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A (West
1989 & Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 18-336.1(b), -338.1(b), (c) (1991 & Supp.
1992); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 333.5133(2) (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(1) (1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130-148(h) (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242(A) (Anderson 1992); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.3 (West Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605(a) (1993); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6-12 to -14 (1989 & Supp. 1993); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
81.105 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(c) (1991).
146. See ALA. CODE § 22-11A-51 (Supp. 1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(A) (Supp.
1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(b), (c) (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
199.22(a) (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1401 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-582 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202 (Supp. 1992); FLA.
STAT. § 381.004(3)(a) (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17A-2 to -3 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 325-16 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-609 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 /,
7304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.5-2.5 (Burns Supp. 1992); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 141.8, .22 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2913(c) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 214.181(5)(a), .625(5)(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13.A
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endorsed the idea of prohibiting involuntary HIV testing by making
written, informed consent a requirement for receiving grants under
The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of
1990.147 At a minimum, most state statutes require that the person
be informed that the test is voluntary. 14 Most statutes, however,
require actual "consent,"'149 "informed consent,"'r- or written and informed consent. 151 The American jurisdictions which have ruled on the

issue have unanimously endorsed voluntary testing and prohibited
involuntary testing. 152 Those jurisdictions granted only limited exceptions.
(West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. §§ 18-336, 338.1(b), (c) (1991 & Supp. 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §
"70F(Law. Co-op Supp. 1992); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 333.5133(2) (1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
144.765 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-16 (Supp. 1992); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.674
(Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(1) (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
141-F:5 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-2 (Michie 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781.1
(McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h).(1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.5-02
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242(A) (Anderson 1992); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
1-502.3 (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.045 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605(a)
(1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6-12 to -14 (1989 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-255,
44-29-230 (Law Co-op Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-35B-3 (Supp. 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-521 (Supp. 1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.105
(West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-36 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-37.2(A) (Michie
1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.330 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(c) (1991);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(2) (West Supp. 1992).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-61(b) (Supp. III 1991).
148. IOWA CODE ANN. §8 141.8, .22 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.765 (West
Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(c) (1991).
149. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.5-2.5 (Burns Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
1-502.3 (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.330 (West 1992).
150. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22(a) (West 1990); FLA. STAT. § 381.004(3)(a)
(Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 214.181(5), .625(5) (Baldwin 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
130A-148(h) (1992); OHoO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242(A) (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §
433.045 (1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.105 (West 1992).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-61(b) (Supp. III 1991); ALA. CODE § 22-11A-51 (Supp. 1992); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 325-16 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , 7304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13.A (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A (West
& Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 18-336, 338.1(b), (c) (1991 & Supp. 1992);
MicH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5133(2) (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(1) (1991); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605(a) (1993); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6-12 to -14 (1989 & Supp. 1993); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(2), (3) (West
Supp. 1992).
152. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. As of June 15, 1993, the following jurisdictions do not endorse, imply or require that consent is needed for HIV testing. Alaska, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, Vermont, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. See supra note 146
and accompanying text. Given the rush of legislatures dealing with this issue I would not be
surprised if most, if not all, of these jurisdictions also have passed statutes prohibiting involuntary
testing by the time you read this article.
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Limited Exceptions

Exceptions to voluntary testing are closely limited in scope for
extremely practical reasons. Most of the exceptions deal with medical
necessity. Testing is typically allowed on body fluids or parts destined
for medical research, transfusion, or transplantation.16 In such cases,
it is paramount to know whether the body fluids or parts are infected
with HIV; whereas, there is little concern for privacy because the
donor released his or her body to further life or science. Additionally,
health care workers exposed to possibly contaminated body fluids
are granted leave to demand an HIV test.1 5This exception recognizes
that health care workers, who are on the front lines in the battle
against AIDS, take great risks for the benefit of all and deserve extra
protection. 1 Likewise, truly blind medical testing poses no privacy
153. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(B)(1) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-582(e)(2) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(c)(3) (Supp. 1992); HAW.REV.
STAT. § 325-16(b)(1) (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 141.22(5)(a) (West 1989); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1300.13(F)(1) (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(9)(a) (1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 103A-148(b), (c) (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.24.2(E)(3) (Anderson 1992); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605(g)(1)(i) (1993); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.102(a)(4)(B)
(West 1992); W. VA.CODE § 16-3C-2(e)(1) (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(2)(1) (West Supp.
1992).
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-950(b) (Michie 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(e)(1)
(West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(c)(4) (Supp. 1992); HAw. REV. STAT. §
325-16(b)(6) (Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A(4) (West 1989); MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. § 18-338.1(c) (Supp. 1992); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5133(12)(b) (1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(10) (1991) (allowing a test only on previously drawn blood
samples after requesting a voluntary test); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.24.2(E)(6) (Anderson
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.3(A)(2) (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.065
(1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-14(d), (e) (Supp. 1992); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
81.050, .102(a)(3), .107 (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340(4) (West Supp. 1992)
(extending also to police, firefighters, and other categories of employment at risk of exposure
to body fluids); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(2) (5) (West Supp. 1992).
155. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7602(b)-(d) (1993). The Pennsylvania General Assembly
specifically noted in its Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act:
[I]ndividual health care providers are increasingly concerned about occupational
exposure to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the causative agent for acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Due to the nature of their work, individual
health care providers and first responders frequently come into contact with the
blood and/or body fluids of individuals whose HIV infection status is not known.
Regardless of the use of universal precautions to prevent HIV transmission between
patients and individual health care providers, there will be instances of significant
exposure to t1"a blood and/or body fluids of patients.
It is the further intent of the General Assembly to provide a narrow
exposure notification and information mechanism for individual health care providers or first responders, who experience a significant exposure to a patient's blood
and/or body fluids, to learn of a patient's HIV infection status ....
Id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15, legislative history (Michie 1991) (stating that "health
care providers require early information relating to the HIV status of patients").
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problem, has great potential for medical advancement, and thus, is
often excepted.,' Testing in an emergency situation where an individual is unable to give consent is also allowed as a matter of necessity. 157
Finally, testing in conjunction with an autopsy is often allowed since
privacy is generally only a concern for the living.'i
The criminal justice system is something of a different world. is9
Several states require convicts or suspects in sexual offense cases to
be tested.' 60 This exception recognizes that victims of sexual offenses
156. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(B)(2) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-582(e)(3) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 16, § 1202(c)(2) (Supp. 1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 325-16(b)(2) (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16--9.5-2.5(b)(3) (Burns Supp.
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13(F)(2) (West 1992); MICH. COmP. LAWS § 333.5133(10)
(1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(9)(b) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.24.2(E)(2)
(Anderson 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605(g)(1)(ii) (1993); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 81.103(e) (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.330(2) (West 1992); W. VA. CODE §
16-3C-2(e)(3) (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(2)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
157. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(B)(4), (5) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-582(e)(1) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(c)(1) (Supp. 1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 325-16(b)(5) (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.5-2.5(b)(1) (Burns Supp. 1992);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 141.22(5)(b) (West 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.181(3) (Baldwin
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13(F)(3) (West 1992); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.5133(13)
(1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(9)(c) (1991) (testing without consent only if relative,
guardian, or significant other not available to provide consent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3701.24.2(E)(1) (Anderson 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605(g)(2) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-6-14(a)-(c), (f) (1989 & Supp. 1992); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.330(1) (West 1992);
W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(e)(2), (f)(3)(1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(2)(3), .025(2)(4) (West

1991 & Supp. 1992) (allowing testing of mentally ill and children without consent).
158. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(B)(3) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-582(e)(4) (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13(F)(3) (West 1992); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 146.025(5)(12) (West 1991).

159. Compare Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (denying involuntary HIV
testing in a civil case by explaining that laboratories are specifically prohibited from testing for
AIDS absent a signed consent, or where the physical conditions of a party are in controversy,
and the testing is material and relevant with no less intrusive means of proving the facts in
controversy) with People v. Durham, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944, 945-47 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (allowing involuntary HIV testing in a criminal case by simply explaining that the defendant put his physical
condition in controversy by telling the victim he had AIDS prior to the alleged rape).
160. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13(F)(7) (West 1992) (requiring involuntary
testing in cases of rape or incest); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-521(a)(2) (Supp. 1992) (requiring
involuntary testing of convicted rapists at the request of the victim); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 70.24.340, .360, .370 (West 1992) (requiring involuntary testing of certain sex and drug
related offenders, and of jail detainees and correction facility inmates who pose a possible risk
to other persons); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(f)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (requiring involuntary
testing of persons convicted of sex related offenses); see also Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F.
Supp. 898, 901 (D.V.I. 1991) (forcing a rape suspect to undergo HIV testing); Love v. Superior
Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664-66 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding HIV testing constitutional in prostitution cases); People v. Thomas, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (Schoharie County Ct. 1988) (requiring
HIV testing of convicted rapist); Durham, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 945-47 (allowing involuntary HIV
testing of rapist who put HIV status in controversy by telling the victim that he had AIDS).
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have already been traumatized and also should not have to suffer the
uncertainty of their potential exposure to HIV. 161 In addition to testing
sexual offenders, Illinois requires testing of individuals convicted of
illegally possessing hypodermic needles, theorizing that IV-drug users
are at particular risk and are far less likely to take measures to
prevent spreading the disease than are others.- Controlling the serious AIDS problem in the prison system has given rise to another
push for mandatory testing in the criminal justice environment. AIDS
in prisons has spread rapidly and beyond proportion to the rest of
society. 163Despite the uniformity of policy in the civil area, the criminal
justice system is divided about AIDS control policy.- One group
follows the lead of public health officials and advocates voluntary testing and education in the prison system.6 3 The other group believes
that mandatory testing and segregation are necessary to prevent the
spread of AIDS in prisons. 1 They argue that prisoners have a lower
M

161. See Durham, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (stating that a rape victim has the right to know
whether she was exposed to the AIDS virus).
162. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
1005-5-3(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); see also People v.
C.S., 583 N.E.2d 726, 729 (App. Ct. 1991), cert. denied, 602 N.E.2d 461 (Ill. 1992) (citing studies
and statistics showing that IV drug users are less likely to practice safe sex and more likely
to spread HIV through blood transfusions); People v. Thomas, 580 N.E.2d 1353, 1365 (App.
Ct. 1991), cert. denied, 587 N.E.2d 1023 (Ill. 1992) (holding that a statute requiring an individual
convicted of unlawful possession of a hypodermic needle to undergo HIV testing was not unconstitutional).
163. See Myers v. Maryland Div. of Correction, 782 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (D. Md. 1992).
164. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1519 (11th Cir. 1991).
165. See, e.g., Robbins v. Clarke, 946 F. 2d 1331, 1332 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that names
of HIV positive inmates may be withheld from general prison population to protect privacy
interests); Deutsch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 737 F. Supp. 261, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that a prison's decision to integrate HIV positive inmates into the general prison
population to protect privacy was not cruel and unusual punishment).
166. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-11A-17 (1990) (mandating that persons sentenced to city
or county correctional facilities for more than 30 days be tested for sexually transmitted diseases);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(e)(6)-(7) (West Supp. 1993) (allowing correction facility
physician to test for HIV for diagnostic purposes, HIV-related treatment, or if an inmate's
behavior poses a risk of transmission); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-108 (1991) (allowing testing
of anyone imprisoned within the state); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.24.2(E)(4) (Anderson
1992) (allowing the testing of prisoners upon showing of good cause); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
16-15-255 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (requiring the testing of convicted sexual offenders); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 64-13-36(2) (Supp. 1992) (requiring tests of prisoners within the state's jurisdiction);
Harris, 941 F.2d at 1518-21 (disclosing inmates HIV positive status as a result of.segregating
infected inmates from the genhral prison population did not violate constitutionally protected
privacy interests because those rights were outweighed by legitimate penological interests);
Muhammad v. Carlson, 845 F.2d 175, 179 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that no constitutionally
protected liberty interests exist in prison's procedures to identify, treat, and isolate HIV positive
inmates).
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expectation of privacy, 167 engage in high risk behavior, 16 and are recalcitrant, thus making the inmates unresponsive to education. 169 There
is more than a hint of retribution too: that the testing is part of their
0 In addition to the division concerning the propriety of
punishmentY7
mandatory testing in the prison system, there is also a division regarding its constitutionality. 171 Because there is no consensus on how to
deal with AIDS in the criminal justice system, mandatory testing of
suspects and criminals stands on its own and should not muddle the
analysis in the civil area where there is an overwhelming consensus

for voluntary testing.
The only exception outside medical necessity and criminal law is
for life insurance companies.H This exception was heavily lobbied for
by the insurance industry as an underwriting necessity and a simple
extension of the freedom already granted to insurance companies to

167. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059
(1990); Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1571 (M.D. Ala. 1990), affid in part and vacated
in part, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
168. See Harris, 941 F.2d at 1520-21. Despite attempts to curb high risk behavior, it is
generally acknowledged that IV-drug use and homosexual activity are a given in the prison
situation. Id. Additionally, a "youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang
rape his first night in jail, or, it has been said, even in the van on the way to jail. Weaker
inmates become the property of stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell the sexual services of
the victim." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421 (1980).
169. See Harris, 941 F.2d at 1520.
170. See Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1194 (finding the violation of privacy in mandatory testing was
justified given the already reduced privacy interest of prisoners); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
537 (1979) (stating that "loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement').
171. Compare Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding involuntary
HIV testing of prison inmates unconstitutional absent a legitimate penological objective related
to the blood-testing policy) with Harris, 941 F.2d at 1568-72 (holding involuntary HIV testing
constitutional because the testing was reasonably related to prime considerations of safety,
security, and the spread of disease) and Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1195-97 (holding involuntary HIV
testing of a prison inmate constitutional because the prison had a substantial interest in treating
HIV-positive inmates and preventing transmission, which outweighed the inmates limited right
to privacy).
172. Russel P. Iuculano & Julie A. Spiezio, Summary of AIDS Related Laws, Regulations,
and Bulletins Affecting the Ability to Underumite for AIDS, in AIDS LAw, supra note 92,
app. U (Supp. 1991) (compiling laws related to HIV testing by insurance companies); see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(e)(9) (West Supp. 1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 325-16(b)(4) (Supp.
1992); IowA CODE ANN. § 141.22(5)(c) (West 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.46 (Anderson
Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605(g)(1)(iii) (1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 81.108 (West Supp. 1992); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-4 (West Supp. 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.325 (West 1992).
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require physical examinations for genuine underwriting purposes. 17
However, only limited testing is allowed for underwriting purposes.174
In addition, it must be noted that several states have clauses in
their voluntary testing statutes which allow involuntary testing when
required by federal or state law.175 Given that each of the jurisdictions
has publicly pronounced its commitment to voluntary testing, these
clauses should not be seen as broad avenues to allow general state
and federal statutes to mandate HIV testing. To do so would enable
the exceptions to swallow the rule. As with all other exceptions, they
should be read narrowly. Thus, involuntary testing required by federal
or state law should be limited to situations where the state legislature
or Congress has affirmatively mandated HIV testing.
Strict safeguards are uniformly built into exceptions. All reasonable
means to get consent must be exhausted.176 Court or administrative
orders are often required before the involuntary testing can take
place.- Those hearings are in camera at the request of the individual,
173. See Russel P. Iuculano, Life Insurance, in AIDS LAW, supra note 92, §§ 12.1-.21.
There has been considerable controversy and quite a bit of industry lobbying over whether
insurance companies should be allowed to test. Id. Several states have prohibited or severely
restricted the use of HIV antibody tests for determining insurability. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 199.21(f) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting the use of HIV test results to
determine insurability); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-224(b) (Supp. 1988) (allowing the named insured
to appeal a positive HIV test with the possibility of the insurer being ordered to disregard the
result); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101(a)(9) (Supp. 1992) (allowing the release of HIV test results
to insurer for reimbursement for services rendered to patient, unless patient agrees to make
reimbursement directly); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(20)(a) (Supp. 1992) (prohibiting insurance
companies from requiring or requesting HIV test results). New York and Massachusetts have
adopted administrative regulations prohibiting testing by insurance companies, but both regulations were struck down as beyond the authority of the administering body. Life Ins. Ass'n v.
Singer, 530 N.E.2d 168, 170 (Mass. 1988); Health Ins. Ass'n v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615,
619-20 (App. Div. 1990), affd, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990). Many states prohibit the use of
HIV tests taken prior to the application or require informed consent and counseling. Iuculano
& Spiezio, supra note 172, app. U. A number of states have also considered and rejected strict
restrictions on insurance use of HIV tests. See id.
174. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
175. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(A) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a582(a) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1992); TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.105 (West Supp. 1992) (granting involuntary testing "as required
by law").
176. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-15 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.024(2) (West 1992).
177. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(e)(8) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-17A-2
(Michie 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-9.5-2.5(b)(2), -2.5(c) (West 1992); MO. ANN. STAT. §
191.674 (Vernon 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.3(A)(3) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 433.080 (1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.050 (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.24.024 (West 1992). Even where court orders are not specifically required, they
might still be sought either by those desiring the involuntary test so that they are certain they
are not violating the general requirement of voluntariness or by the person to be tested in the
form of a restraining order.
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and the records are closed to the public178 In nearly all cases the
information obtained from the involuntary tests is released only to a
limited number of people. 1 9 Records of involuntary tests are in some
states even prohibited from being included in the patient's records.80
Counseling is usually required as part of the exception's, or as part
of the general statute. 12 Involuntary tests conducted outside the exceptions may subject the violator to criminal 2 or civil penalties. 8 4
Given the specificity of the exceptions and the safeguards to keep
them in bounds, they must be seen as limited and discrete.8 2 Courts

should decline to create new exceptions and should read those granted
quite narrowly.
C. AIDS PreventionStatutes Specifically Dealingwith IME Statutes
Only New York and Delaware have confronted the issue of mandatory examinations in discovery. The New York statute requiring
consent makes reference to the New York equivalent of Rule 35:
"Except as provided in section three thousand one hundred twenty-one
of the civil practice law and rules, . . . no person shall order the

178. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.674(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
179. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(b), -905(c) (Michie 1991) (providing for release of
test results only to the health care worker, and his or her doctor, when the health care worker
is involved in contact with patient's blood or body fluids, but only to patient when testing is
done out of medical necessity); MICH. ComiP. LAws § 333.5131(3) (1991).
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(e)(5) (West Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 19203-A(4) (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(9)(d) (1991).
181. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(e) (1991); MICH.COMP. LAWS § 333.5133 (14) (1991).
182. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(b), (c) (West Supp. 1993).
183. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(11) (1991) (punishing as a misdemeanor with
up to six months imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.080
(West 1992) (punishing as a gross misdemeanor with up to one year imprisonment, a $5,000
fine, or both).
184. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-16(d) (Supp. 1992) (providing a fine for willful violators
of at least $1,000 and up to $10,000 plus reasonable attorney's fees and court costs); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 214.181(8) (Baldwin 1992) (providing that any violation may be grounds for a
professional disciplinary action against the health care provider); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7610
(1993) (creating a cause of action against any violator for compensatory damages plus attorney's
fees and court costs); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.084 (West 1992) (providing for a fine
of $1,000 or actual damages, whatever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees, court costs,
and other appropriate relief); see Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 877 (W.D. Wis. 1988)
(allowing a claim against prison medical personnel for releasing HIV status to nonmedical prison
employees); Dotson v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 090017, 1990 WL 284370 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
2, 1990) (allowing a claim against a hospital for releasing the results of an involuntary HIV test
to plaintiffs employer).
185. See Doe v. Hirsch, 731 F. Supp. 627, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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performance of an HIV related test without first receiving the written, informed consent of the subject of the test who has capacity to
consent. . .,,16 Section 3121 of New York's Civil Practice Law is
quite similar to Rule 35: "After commencement of an action in which
the mental or physical condition or the blood relationship of a party
• . . is in controversy, any party may serve notice on another party
to submit to a physical, mental or blood examination by a designated
physician.' ' 187 The problem is that the statute fails to indicate the
parameters within which a test may be ordered. One is left with no
more guidance than before. However, the New York courts have
considered the privacy and public health concerns and require the
petitioner to show a compelling need for an HIV test. 11
Delaware has gone much further in addressing mandatory testing
in a Rule 35 type of situation. The Delaware statute has created an
exception to voluntary testing when
[t]esting is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction
within the confines of civil or criminal litigation where the
results of an HIV-related test of a party, or a person in the
custody or under the legal control of another party, is relevant to the ultimate issue of culpability and/or liability.'
This is not, however, a freewheeling invitation to courts to order HIV
tests. The test can be ordered only after strict guidelines are met:
Said order must be issued in compliance with the following
provisions:
a. No court of this State shall issue such order unless
the court finds that there is a compelling need for such test
results which cannot be accommodated by other means. In

186. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2781(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
187. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 3121(a) (McKinney 1991).
188. See Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721-22 (Sup. Ct. 1988). The court noted that most
experts, medical organizations, and state and local health departments oppose mandatory testing
because of the negative factors associated with a positive test result. Id. at 721. These factors
include the lack of absolutely reliable testing, threats to civil liberties, the danger of ostracization
and stigmatization, and psychic harm. Id. The court concluded that probable cause and a compelling need must be shown to subject a person to an involuntary blood test. Id. at 722; see
also Anne D. v. Raymond D., 528 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that an ajlegation of
infidelity in a divorce case is not sufficient to compel an HIV test). But see People v. Durham,
553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (interpreting N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 3121(a) as requiring
testing in a criminal case, where a rape suspect put his physical condition "in controversy" when
he told the victim that he had AIDS).
189. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(c)(6) (Supp. 1992).
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assessing compelling need, the court shall weigh the need
for testing and disclosure of the test results against the
privacy interest of the test subject and the public interest
which may be disserved by disclosure which deters future
testing or which may lead to discrimination.
b. Pleadings pertaining to ordering of an HIV-related
test shall substitute a pseudonym for the true name of the
subject of the test. The true name shall be communicated
confidentially, in documents not filed with the court.
c. Before granting any such order, the court shall provide
the individual whose test result is in question with notice
and a reasonable opportunity to participate in the proceedings if he or she is not already a party.
d. Court proceedings as to disclosure of test results so
ordered shall be conducted in camera unless the subject of
the test agrees to a hearing in open court or unless the court
determines that a public hearing is necessary to the public
interest and the proper administration of justice. 19°
The first, and perhaps most important limitation, is that HIV-infection
status must be relevant to liability, not damages. 19' For example,
applying the Delaware statute to the Pennsylvania mechanic's case,'9
the defense attorneys' request for an HIV test would be denied because
the test was requested to reduce damages, not to determine liability. 1
This is a prudent limitation. If courts were to allow tests on the issue
of damages, HIV status would be relevant to any case where the
plaintiff requested future damages because the virus is generally assumed to shorten one's expected life span. Because future damages
are probably part of almost every personal injury case, possibly every
personal injury plaintiff could be required to be tested for HIV. Considering the number of personal injury claims filed each year,'9 that
would open a jumbo-jet-sized loophole in the voluntary testing scheme.
Even if HIV infection status is an issue of liability, the court must
still find a "compelling need" for the test that overcomes the invasion
95
of personal privacy and the resulting damage to public health policy.
The court also must find that no less intrusive means of discovering
the information exists. 1' A test can be ordered, but only when HIV

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
supra note 189 and accompanying text.
infra note 210 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying note 190.
supratext accompanying note 190.
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status is directly an issue of liability.19 Involuntary testing should be
rare under the Delaware statute, but it represents a solid balance
that will preserve the public health.
Several AIDS prevention statutes might arguably bring Rule 35
within their scope by including clauses allowing involuntary testing
when required by federal or state law. 198 As seen above, however, those
clauses should be read very narrowly and be applied only to specific
exceptions enacted by state legislatures and Congress.99 In particular,
they should not be read to allow Rule 35 or its state counterparts to
require mandatory testing. Since the IME statutes failed to address
whether HIV testing should be mandated in litigation, one needs to
look to the privacy and public health issues to balance them against
the interests of fact finding in litigation. That brings one right back
to the AIDS prevention statutes and their prohibition of mandatory
testing. Thus, statutes allowing tests required by federal or state law
give no guidance concerning the IME statutes, and they should not
be construed to allow mandatory testing in discovery.
D.

Conclusion: Uniformity of Opinion Favoring Voluntary
HIV Testing

There is great uniformity across the country about voluntary HIV
testing in general society.2°° Most public health experts have called
for voluntary testing.21 Nearly every state in the Union now requires
voluntary testing by law.202 It is probably only a matter of time before
the jurisdictions that have not already done so pass their own voluntary
testing laws. Only a few exceptions to voluntary testing have been
outlined, and they deal almost entirely with contravening public health
concerns and medical emergencies. - Two states, New York and Delaware, specifically reference IME statutes. New York has an old statute, in which the legislature put little thought into how the IME
statute would affect voluntary testing.2 Delaware, however, is a
model for limiting involuntary testing only to situations where it is
197. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(c)(6) (Supp. 1992).
198. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(A) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-582(a) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1992); TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.105 (West Supp. 1992) (allowing involuntary testing "as required
by law").
199. See supra text accompanying notes 153-85.
200. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
202. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 153-85 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
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m 5 Both should be read as attempts to make the IME
vital to the case.2
statutes work with the voluntary testing scheme rather than as true
exceptions. Any sort of mandatory testing is truly an exception to the
norm of voluntary testing.

VI.

MAKING IME STATUTES WORK WITH THE AIDS
PREVENTION STATUTES

The IME statutes, Rule 35 and its state counterparts, and the
voluntary testing requirements of AIDS prevention statutes are potentially in conflict. To the extent that judges order HIV testing under
the IME statutes, they are mandating testing. The AIDS prevention
statutes require that testing be voluntary.20 It is certain that the
legislatures, had they considered it, would never have intended the
conflict. Unfortunately, the IME statutes do not contemplate the AIDS
epidemic, and the HIV testing statutes, for the most part, do not
contemplate Rule 35 or its state counterparts.
It is vital to the fight against AIDS that IME statutes and AIDS
prevention statutes work together. The problem is finding the balance
that will allow the search for truth in litigation to live in harmony
with the necessity for voluntary HIV testing. However, the engine
for that balancing is already in place. It is the balancing that has
2°7
always been done under Rule 35 and the state IME statutes.
Because IME statutes have always balanced privacy issues, the
heightened concerns for privacy in the HIV testing area should weigh
heavily.m Mandatory HIV testing, however, threatens far more than
mere individual privacy. It threatens the public health consensus that
has developed in medicine and has been adopted into law in nearly
every American jurisdiction.m
This threat is of ominous size. The threat of involuntary testing
probably looms largest in personal injury cases where nearly every
plaintiff will have some sort of future damages claim which would put
life expectancy at issue. In 1990, nearly 1.8 million personal injury
lawsuits were filed.210 Because IME statutes may require testing in

205. See supra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 38-82 and accompanying text.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
210. According to the National Center for State Courts, 18.3 million civil suits were filed
in state courts in 1990. Laurie Asseo, Slugging It Out in Court, The American Way, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, at A20. According to the NCSC, roughly 10% of those filings were for
personal injury cases. Bert Bauman, Increasing Attacks on Trial by Jury Jeopardizes Our
FundamentalRights, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1992, at 57.
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situations far broader than personal injury alone, over two million
people a year could be threatened with forced HIV tests if testing is
freely allowed under such statutes. The IME statutes are not a mere
exception; they are a gaping sinkhole waiting to swallow the public
health consensus that testing be voluntary.
It might be argued that it would be unthinkable that IME statutes
would be used extensively to require HIV testing. That argument,
however, ignores the very nature of advocacy in litigation. 211 Let us
take, for example, personal injury cases. Personal injury defense
lawyers, such as the defense lawyers in the Pennsylvania mechanic's
case, 212 are constantly looking to reduce their clients' damages. If the
HIV infection indeed lowers a plaintiffs life expectancy, any claim for
future damages also will be lowered. But that is hardly where the
calculus ends. There is a more sinister reason why plaintiffs' lawyers
truly fear the test, and defense lawyers desire it. Juries are often
moved to find for someone, particularly in the amount of damages
awarded, in great proportion by empathy. 21 3 Given the AIDS hysteria
of all too many Americans, 2 14 few juries would be empathetic to an
HIV positive plaintiff. Though the plaintiffs HIV status would ostensibly be introduced only to mitigate future damages, it may also have
a devastating impact on all damages: past, present, and future; general
and special. It may even sway the jury against the plaintiff on the
215
issue of liability.
The calculus may not even stop with the individual case. Faced
with the prospect of a mandated HIV test, potential plaintiffs with
valid claims may choose not to pursue their rights. Although the
insurance defense industry may not have contemplated this, it is hardly
beyond the pale of claims calculations. If even a small fraction of the
1.8 million personal injury plaintiffs refrain from filing suit every year,
the profits to the insurance industry could be immense.

211. According to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer "has a duty to use
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. (1983).
212. See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
213. See ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, TRIAL THEORIES, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES
§ 2.3(o) (1990).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 86-136.
215. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. It might be questioned whether the HIV
test information is so unfairly prejudicial that it should not be admitted under Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and its state counterparts. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice ... ").

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/2

34

Berge: Settling Limits on Involuntary HIV Antibody Testing Under Rule 35
INVOLUNTARY HIV ANTIBODY TESTING

Defense counsel has every advocacy reason to push HIV testing
under IME statutes to its limit.216 Thus, a restrictive limit must be
set. Moreover, the standard applied must certainly be more than mere
relevance. A standard of relevance would not even give litigants the
protection they already have in more routine testing, where the rele2 7
vance must somehow overcome basic medical privacy notions. 1
Even a more stringent standard, such as requiring a compelling
interest for the test, may not be enough. Judges could conceivably
determine that membership in a high risk group triggers a compelling
interest, thereby discriminating against homosexuals and IV-drug
users, among others. 21 As most public health officials have determined
that the best way to modify the behavior of high risk groups is through
voluntary testing,219 judicially mandated testing via the compelling
interest standard may be ineffective if the compelling interest standard
is used to target high risk groups.
The most troublesome problem with the compelling interest standard, however, is that risk groups are transitory and may very well
disappear. AIDS undoubtedly can be a heterosexually transmitted
disease.ml It is predominately so in Africa."" It appears that some
strains of the virus flourish in the moist mucosal tissue of the genitals
making heterosexual transmission easy.m Other strains thrive in the
22
bloodstream making IV-needle and rough sex transmission easy. 4
While the former strain has not been prevalent in the United States,M
that is hardly cause for solace. Given the virus' propensity to mutate,
the heterosexual epidemic will almost surely expand in the United

216. See supra note 211.
217. See supra notes 38-82 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
220. Behavioral changes in gay men seem to have slowed, if not controlled, the spread of
the disease in the gay community. AIDS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES, supra note
107, at 364-70; DAVID E. KANOUSE ET AL., RESPONSE TO THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: A SURVEY
OF HOMOSEXUAL AND BISEXUAL MEN IN Los ANGELES COUNTY ix-x (1991); Marshall H.
Becker & Jill G. Joseph, AIDS and Behavioral Change to Reduce Risk: A Review, 78 Am. J.

PUB. HEALTH 394, 403-06 (1988). In contrast HIV infection has been on the rise among IV-drug
users and inner-city Blacks and Hispanics thus changing the demographics of the risk. See ARNO
& FEIDEN, supra note 115, at 198-206.
221. Christine Gorman, Invincible AIDS, TIME, Aug. 3, 1992, at 30, 33.

222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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States. The heterosexual epidemic may already be happening.3
AIDS clinics in San Francisco and New York City have reported that
women constitute between thirty and fifty percent of their new patients.ns As the heterosexual epidemic grows, the high risk group may
grow to include everyone. Thus, a mere compelling interest test might
eventually give no more protection than the reasonableness standard.
The compelling interest standard does not work now and will certainly
not work in the future. It must, therefore, be rejected.
To reject even the compelling interest standard, however, does
not mean there are no situations in civil litigation where it would be
proper to require HIV testing. It is one thing when the defense is on
a fishing expedition looking for ways of reducing its damages; it is
quite another when a party directly puts her HIV status in controversy. In such cases, HIV status is, as the Rule 35 says, "in controversy. '"- While this is surely a strict reading of the in controversy
requirement, it is justified by the overwhelming privacy, public health,
and justice concerns raised by involuntary HIV testing. HIV status
should be considered in controversy only when placed in controversy
as an issue of liability, not as an issue of damages.=
In the few states where AIDS prevention statutes have not been
enacted, the analysis should not be different. The weight of medical
and legal authority is so overwhelmingly in favor of voluntary testingel

that it should be the guiding light for all decisions about mandatory
testing. Courts in those states, therefore, should feel no difficulty in
requiring HIV status to be in controversy as to liability and requiring
a compelling need to be shown before ordering involuntary testing.
In the federal courts the matter is a bit different. Because Rule
35 is a procedural rule, it is not dependent upon state law.m However,

226. Id.
227. See id. at 34.
228. Id.
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
230. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(c)(6) (Supp. 1992).
231. See supra notes 131-52 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
233. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (holding that Rule 35
should not be set aside, even when in conflict with state law); Leach v. Greif Bros. Cooperage
Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Miss. 1942) (requiring a physical examination under federal law
despite the fact that state law prohibited such an examination); Richard J. Barnet, Compulsory
Medical Examinations Under the Federal Rules, 41 VA. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1955) (explaining
that the drafters of Rule 35 probably did not intend federal courts to be guided by state court
decisions which might "frustrate the uniformity of decision which the Federal Rules contemplate.").
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Rule 35 always has been closely tied in spirit to state IME rules.2
When passed in 1938, Rule 35 was meant to conform to state practices,
and now most state laws allowing IMEs are modeled substantially
upon Rule 35.3 The state statutes are similar enough that federal
courts frequently look to them for guidance3 6 Given that Congress
has now joined the public health community and the state legislatures
in calling for voluntary testing,2 it should be adamantly clear that involuntary testing should be avoided in all but the most egregious of
situations. Thus, Rule 35 should be amended to severely limit HIV
testing in a manner similar to the Delaware statute. m At the very
least, the federal courts should use the independent status of Rule 35
to forge a uniform policy rejecting involuntary HIV testing in IMEs
unless HIV status is in controversy as a question of liability and a
compelling need exists for the test.
VII.

ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA MECHANIC'S CASE

The Pennsylvania mechanic's casem is a good example of how easily
courts can stray. In this case, the court ordered the mechanic to
submit to an HIV test because "the record . . . demonstrate[d] a
genuine controversy as to plaintiffs HIV status and defendants ha[d]
shown good cause for the testing."240 What the record demonstrated
was that the mechanic had been an IV-drug user; that he had tested
negative for HIV antibodies; that an emergency room technician had
scribbled a note that the mechanic had tested positive; that the
mechanic swore in an affidavit that he only had one HIV test;
and that the mechanic had told the ER technician only that he had
tested negative.Y1 The good cause was that HIV status might affect
the ultimate amount of future damages the defendant would have had
to pay.2
The court's order treated the HIV test as if it were as normal as
a cholesterol checkYm There was no mention of the severe privacy
implications of HIV testing. The court apparently ignored the unani-

8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2231, at 664.
235. Id. at 665.
236. Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387, 388 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-61(b) (Supp. III 1991).
234.

238.

DEL.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See
See
See
See
See

CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(c)(6) (Supp. 1992).

supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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mity of opinion among public health officials that testing must be
voluntary. The court does not appear to have even considered that
nearly every jurisdiction in the United States has prohibited involuntary HIV testing,2- including Pennsylvania.?45 The court's first premise, that the HIV test is an ordinary blood test, is patently wrong.
Not having recognized the unique and troubling nature of involuntary HIV tests, the court continued to err by loosely enforcing the
good cause requirement. The court believed that a "genuine controversy" regarding the mechanic's HIV status would suffice .- 6 While
the emergency room attendant's scribbled note may raise a suspicious
eyebrow, it is far more likely a simple mistake.? 7 The note was written
barely six months after the negative test; given the short time span,
the plaintiff's affidavit, which states that he had taken no other HIV
test, is convincing3m Here, unfortunately, the court appears to have
been swayed by the plaintiff's membership in a high risk group.?9 The
minor suspicion created in this case should not be seen as good cause,
let alone a compelling interest for mandating the test.
244. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
245. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605 (1993). The Pennsylvania Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act states:
(a) Consent.-Except as provided in section 6 with respect to the involuntary
testing of a source patient, no HIV-related test shall be performed without first
obtaining the informed written consent of the subject. Any consent shall be preceded
by an explanation of the test, including its purpose, potential uses, limitations and
the meaning of its results.
Id. § 7605(a). Only limited exceptions are granted:
(g) Exceptions.(1) The provisions of subsections (a) ... shall not apply to the following
(i) The performance of an HIV-related test on a cadaver by a health care
provider which procures, processes, distributes or uses a human body or a human
body part, tissue or semen for use in medical research, therapy or transplantation.
(ii) The performance of an HIV-related test for the purpose of medical research
not prohibited by subsection (f) if the testing is performed in a manner by which
the identity of the test subject is not known and may not be retrieved by the
researcher.
(iii) The performance of an HIV-related test when the test result of a subject
is required by an insurer for underwriting purposes. However, the insurer shall
satisfy the requirements of subsection (h).
(2) The provisions of subsections (a) ... shall not apply to the performance of
an HIV-related test in a medical emergency when the subject of the test is unable
to grant or withhold consent and the test result is medically necessary for diagnostic
purposes to provide appropriate emergency care to the subject.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7605(g) (1993).
246. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the biggest problem, however, is how the court turned
the "in controversy" requirement on its head. By holding HIV status
to be in controversy when HIV status would only affect future damages, the court opened the door for abuse. To test every party making
a claim for future damages would make a mockery of voluntary testing;
to limit the testing to those in high risk groups blatantly strikes a
discordantly coercive tone with the very groups with whom public
health officials are seeking to strike a harmonious chord of cooperation.m This is exactly why the "in controversy" requirement should
be viewed from the liability side rather than the damages side. Though
the court found that the mechanic's HIV status was in controversy,2 1
what was really in controversy was whether the defense should be
allowed a fishing expedition into the plaintiffs HIV status.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Voluntary testing is the cornerstone to the public health drive to
slow, if not stop, the spread of AIDS. There is an overwhelming,
nationwide consensus that public health policy demands that HIV tests
be voluntary.m2 But, voluntary testing is more than just a good idea,
it is the declared law in nearly every state in the Union.m Thus,
courts must factor that policy into any decision about mandating HIV
tests as independent medical examinations.
This uniformity of policy should not be surprising. The spread of
HIV is a national, indeed a global, problem and demands a united
defense. The defense that will work the best is to convince people to
change their ways. That will require cooperation, not coercion, and
thus the defenders of the realm have girded themselves in the armor
of voluntary testing, along with counseling and confidentiality. The
civil justice system must also pay great deference to voluntary testing
and should do so with the same uniformity which has characterized
the rest of the legal system's response to the HIV crisis. The courts
should interpret and the legislatures should make clear that HIV tests
will be mandated in civil litigation only when HIV status is a direct
issue of liability and there is a compelling reason to breach the general
rule of voluntary testing. To do otherwise is to open a gaping hole in
our defense. The civil justice system should not, indeed cannot, be
the chink in the armor.
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supra notes 119-36 and accompanying text.
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
supra notes 131-52 and accompanying text.
supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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